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 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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April 27, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
 Executive Secretary
 Department of State

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON
 Executive Secretary
 Department of Defense

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON
 Assistant to the Attorney General
 and Chief of Staff
 Department of Justice

[REDACTED]
 Executive Secretary
 Central Intelligence Agency

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CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER
 Executive Assistant to the Chairman
 Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. JAMES GEER
 Assistant Director of the
 Intelligence Division
 Federal Bureau of Investigation

[REDACTED]
 Chief of Staff
 National Security Agency

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SUBJECT: Meeting of the Interagency Espionage Damage
 Assessment Working Group - April 29, 1987 -
 10:00-11:00 a.m. - White House Situation Room (U)

A meeting of the Espionage Damage Assessment Working Group will be held on Wednesday, April 29, 1987. Three items are on the agenda:

- Presentations by CIA: An assessment of the damage resulting from the Edward Lee Howard espionage case. (20 minutes)
- Reports by the sub-working group lead agencies on progress of the sub-working groups (it is requested this also be in written form to be presented at the meeting and NSA, CIA and State are requested to provide in writing the membership, organization and methodology of their sub-groups). (15 minutes)

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
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- Update on status of activities of each agency.
(15 minutes) (S)

Each agency is requested to provide prepared statements that have been issued publicly as well as copies of any prepared statements used in Congressional testimony. (U)

Attached for your information and possible discussion at the meeting are S. 994 (To improve security at facilities of the United States Government located in foreign countries) and H.J. Res. 230 (To counter Soviet electronic surveillance of United States Embassy activities in Moscow, and for other purposes). (U)

Please provide the names, dates of birth and social security numbers of the individuals who will attend this meeting to David Major (395-4614). (U)


Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment#

1. S. 994
2. H.J. Res. 230

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100th CONGRESS
1st Session

S. 994

to improve security at facilities of the United States Government located in foreign countries.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

April 9 (legislative day, March 30), 1987

Mr. Dole (for himself and Mr. Roth) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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A BILL

to improve security at facilities of the United States Government located in foreign countries.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, \That (a) this Act may be cited as the "Overseas Facilities Security Act of 1987".

(b)(1) Prior to entering on duty in any position directly involving the security of any government facility in a foreign country, every current or prospective government employee, including but not limited to members of the Foreign Service and the Armed Forces of the United States, shall take a polygraph examination limited to determining the possible vulnerability of that employee to recruitment or manipulation by a foreign intelligence service for the purpose of engaging in espionage against the United States. No such employee shall continue in his or her duty or enter on duty if the results of such examination indicate possible vulnerability to such recruitment or manipulation.

(2) Employees for whom the examination results indicate no possible vulnerability to such recruitment or manipulation shall, nevertheless, be subject to periodic polygraph reexaminations. Every such employee shall have at least one such examination every 12 months.

(c) Any employee for whom the examination results indicate possible vulnerability to such recruitment or manipulation shall be immediately placed on administrative leave with pay until such time as thorough security investigation of such employee is undertaken and completed, and a determination is made by the appropriate supervisory official regarding continued fitness of such employee to continue in his or her security-related position.

(d) Whenever the investigation or determination described in subsection (c) is undertaken in a foreign country, the full details of such investigation or determination shall be reported to the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security within 5 days of the completion of such investigation or determination.

(e) The American Ambassador (or the highest ranking American official, when no Ambassador shall be present) to the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Cuba, and the People's Republic of China, Laos, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Yugoslavia countries in which the United States maintains an official presence shall submit to the Under Secretary of State for Management no later than October 1 of each year a complete report--

(1) on the security of the United States diplomatic facilities in such country and the integrity of personnel attached to such facilities during the preceding year;

(2) listing any significant efforts by a foreign government or agent thereof to penetrate or compromise the security of the United States diplomatic facilities, or to recruit or manipulate any government employees the aim of conducting espionage against the United States; and

(3) describing the security program or programs at such facilities for the upcoming year.

(f) The Under Secretary of State for Management shall, within 90 days after receiving the report described in subsection (e), transmit the report to the Congress, together with--

(1) an evaluation of the security program or programs described in subsection (e); and

(2) any further statement, comments, or recommendations he may submit regarding the security of the United States diplomatic facilities and personnel.

(g) Any government employee providing physical security to any United States diplomatic facility in any country denominated in subsection (e) shall serve a tour of duty in such country no longer than 18 months, unless the Under Secretary of State for Management certifies in writing to the Congress that such a tour of duty is required to protect the national security interests of the United States.

100TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. J. RES. 230

To counter Soviet electronic surveillance of United States Embassy activities in Moscow, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 8, 1987

Mr BROOMFIELD introduced the following joint resolution: which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

JOINT RESOLUTION

To counter Soviet electronic surveillance of United States Embassy activities in Moscow, and for other purposes.

1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 That this joint resolution may be cited as the "Moscow Em-
4 bassy Security Resolution".

5 SEC. 2. The Congress finds and declares that—

6 (a) the Government of the Union of Soviet Social-
7 ist Republics has violated the diplomatic privileges and
8 immunities of the Embassy of the United States of
9 America by surreptitiously entering that Embassy to
10 conduct espionage;

(b) the Soviet penetration of the Embassy constitutes a gross violation of international law;

(c) the Soviet penetration of the Embassy has inflicted grave damage upon the national security of the United States;

(d) the security of the United States of America requires that personnel of the Government of the United States of America in Moscow can communicate in confidence;

(e) due to the actions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America cannot communicate in confidence within the present Embassy in Moscow, nor within the proposed new Embassy in Moscow;

(f) the agreements between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the proposed new locations in Moscow and Washington, District of Columbia, of the embassies of those countries incorporate a reservation, implied by the principle to which both parties subscribe of the inviolability of Embassy premises, that a party to the agreements may withdraw from the agreements to the extent the national security interests of the party so require; and

1 (g) to protect the national security of the United
2 States of America, the United States must exercise the
3 implied reservation to withdraw from the new Embassy
4 location agreements.

5 SEC. 3. (a) The United States of America hereby with-
6 draws, effective on the date specified by subsection (c), from
7 the Agreement Between the Government of the United
8 States of America and the Government of the Union of
9 Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reciprocal Allocation for
10 Use Free of Charge of Plots of Land in Moscow and Wash-
11 ington, signed at Moscow, May 16, 1969, and related agree-
12 ments, notes, and understandings of whatever nature.

13 (b) The Secretary of State shall, within five days after
14 the date of enactment of this joint resolution, notify the Gov-
15 ernment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that
16 Mount Alto will cease to be available to that Government for
17 any purpose effective on the date specified by subsection (c).

18 (c) The date to which subsections (a) and (b) refer is the
19 earlier of—

20 (1) one year and ten days after the date of enact-
21 ment of this joint resolution; or

22 (2) such date as may be agreed upon by the Gov-
23 ernment of the United States of America and the Gov-
24 ernment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics